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Practice Before the United States Board of
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*
By J. G. Korner, Jr.
Axioms and time-worn adages have a tendency to become fixed
as always expressing a truth, and all of us, being human with
minds more or less prone to fixation by habit, are surprised when
we find one of these accepted catch-phrases to be disproven. One
of the oldest of these is the saying: “You can’t teach an old dog
new tricks”—and its converse, “You can’t teach a new dog old
tricks.” The experience of the board of tax appeals is showing
that the certified public accountants of our country are relegating
this time-honored truism into the limbo of disproven things.
The law student and the licentiate soon come to know that
there are at least two great branches of their profession that no
teacher can fully impart to them. One is trial procedure and the
other, in an almost equal degree, the law of evidence. Experience
is the only teacher who can impart these subjects to the practi
tioner. And we all know that experience is an expensive, al
though a thorough, preceptor. The lawyer, with a professional
background of over seven hundred years of Anglo-Saxon legal in
stitutions, finds this as true today as it was centuries ago. It is
not surprising then that a younger profession without that back
ground and experience of predecessors, and without preliminary
training in that direction, should find difficulty in a quick mastery
of these elusive subjects.
It is because of this apparent fact that I have chosen as the sub
ject of this talk the practice and procedure before the board of
tax appeals. It was with considerable diffidence that I chose a
topic which might to someone have the appearance of placing me
in the position of lecturing the members of a profession which has
*An address delivered at a regional meeting of the American Institute of Accountants, Cincin
nati, Ohio, May 23,1925.
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proven that it is quite able to take care of itself. Therefore, I
conferred with some of the members of the Institute who stand
high in your councils, as to the propriety of my doing so. I was
assured that a frank discussion of a subject so vital to you in your
relation to the board of tax appeals would be welcomed by you.
Thus assured, I have undertaken to do so. Suggestions and even
criticism of a constructive nature ought to be mutually helpful to
the understanding of problems whose difficulties are mutual
and even inter-dependent, as between your profession and the
board.
It is my desire, then, to discuss with you what I consider a
problem of genuine mutuality between us. Your aim in the tax
practice is the same as the aim of the board in administering it—
but viewed perhaps from a different standpoint. The real aim of
both of us is to arrive at the truth of every problem presented and
to attain a just and righteous result. If that result is attained,
both of us have done our duty. If you present a taxpayer’s
appeal fully and adequately and that result is not attained, it is
the fault of the board. On the other hand if your presentation is
not a full and adequate one, and the desired result (just referred
to) is not attained, then the fault does not lie with the board.
Now, to arrive at justice the truth must first be revealed. All
justice and fair dealings are based on truth. The truth of every
problem must depend on the exposition of the facts. After all,
truth is but the composite-mass of all the facts. Justice is but the
correct conclusion deduced from these facts. Since the right con
clusion is predicated on the facts, it is obvious that such a conclu
sion can not be drawn without the underlying truth, i. e., the facts
supporting it.
In February I was at Johns Hopkins university at the occasion
of the conferring of the degree of doctor of laws upon Hon. Owen
D. Young, (associate and colleague of Vice-President Dawes) of
the reparation commission. In the course of his address Mr.
Young adverted to the propensity of human kind, and of Ameri
cans in particular, to arrive at conclusions without any knowledge
of the facts in the case. He observed that he had come to the
conclusion that “facts” are about the scarcest commodity in the
universe and that this conclusion of his is based on the paucity
with which they are used. There is much food for thought in this
observation. Arguments, either oral or in brief, do not constitute
facts. Arguments are but conclusions predicated on a given state
2
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of facts. Definiteness of issue, clarity of presentation, and, above
all, accurate facts, are the elements most necessary in the proper
decision of cases. With the facts before us, the solution of the
problem may not be easy but it certainly is more apt to be
correct.
It is the experience of the ages that no game can be played with
out rules. The experience of judicial tribunals for centuries has
proven that correctly to determine the issues between litigants,
there must likewise be rules. As in the case of the game, this in
sures fair play and expedition. The board of tax appeals realized
this at the outset. It likewise realized the magnitude of the task
before it and set about to find a way in which both of these essen
tial elements could be found. So the first problem with which the
board was confronted was that of determining its policy with re
spect to rules of practice. Congress left the question of formality
of procedure to the judgment of the board. Thus it became
necessary to decide whether to provide for very informal pro
ceedings or for strictly technical rules, or for some system be
tween the two. The board had the experience of the bureau of
internal revenue before it and decided that the highly informal
procedure there was not suited to the task in hand. It likewise
had the experience of the courts with the technicalities necessary
to such a system, and it was decided that such a system was not
best adapted to our use. So the board adopted a policy midway
between the two. Since there is no jury, the strict legal rules of
evidence were not deemed necessary. The rules were drawn to
permit a full presentation of the fact without undue restriction.
On the other hand, the board is not in any wise a part of, or
branch of, or connected with, the treasury department. No
bureau record comes before the board except as it is properly in
troduced by the parties. There being no record except that
made by the parties, it was necessary to prescribe rules which
would tend to build up a record with the elimination of all ex
trinsic and immaterial matters. If my hearers would bear this
in mind, much of the difficulty which is found with the rules would
be dissipated.
I was for three years in the bureau of internal revenue and I am
familiar with the practice there. For that reason I see and ap
preciate the difficulties some of you find with the practice pre
scribed by the board. I realize keenly that the practice before
the bureau has had the tendency to unfit you in a way for the
3
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practice before the board. To me this is not surprising. Indeed
it would be surprising if it were not so. Let me put it this way:
Those of you who for a long time have practised before the
bureau have become familiar with that system and you are in
clined to be thrown off, even bewildered, by a procedure radically
different. Let me illustrate: You have a tax case to present.
You prepare it largely along the lines which would suggest them
selves to an accountant. You go to the unit. There you sit
down at a table with one or more men of your own profession.
You speak to him or them in the language of your profession—in
the language of the tribe, so to speak. They understand you and
you understand them. In a sense you have the same viewpoint.
No studied attempt is made to segregate and classify facts as dis
tinguished from conclusions. Letters, ex parte affidavits, un
sworn statements, briefs of argument, contentions, rulings, opin
ions and the like, all go into the record indiscriminately. Finally
a great mass of data is collected —a great deal of which is in the
brain of the conferees. You are quite familiar with what hap
pens if the conferee dies or resigns, or if some person on whom you
depend for substantiation of your position is unavailable. The
government conferee and the reviewing bodies in the bureau may
choose from the record that which impresses him or them. In a
few words, the record is not one which could legally bind anyone.
The findings of fact and the logic of the conclusion are not re
quired to be set forth by the bureau and if the decision is adverse
to you, you wonder why—and you sometimes ask why.
Now the statute creating the board requires that the hearings and
the records be open to the public. It further provides that the board
shall make and publish its findings of fact, which shall be prima facie
evidence of the facts so found in a proceeding in court either by the
commissioner or by the taxpayer. It is obvious, then, that the
record upon which such findings of fact are predicated must be care
fully and legally constructed. The purpose of the rules of proce
dure and evidence adopted by the board is to accomplish that thing.
I can not here go into a discussion of what constitutes proof of
fact. To do so would be to attempt to cover the whole field of
evidence. I think the purpose of this discussion would be better
met by pointing out a few of the things which do not constitute
evidence. Chief among these are:
(1) The petition,
(2) Statement of counsel,
4
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(3) Unidentified and unauthenticated documents and letters,
(4) Rulings of the bureau of internal revenue,
(5) Affidavits which have not been submitted to the solicitor
and agreed by him to be submitted as evidence,
(6) Balance-sheets, valuation appraisals and mathematical
computations of various kinds, unsupported by proof
of the facts they contain. As a rule such evidence is
nothing more than opinion evidence of the person pre
paring it and is necessarily in the nature of conclu
sions. It carries with it the right of the opposing party to
cross-examine the witness to test his qualifications to
testify and to establish the facts on which such conclu
sion and opinion are predicated,
(7) Briefs and written argument filed by taxpayer.
The enumeration I have just given points out only a few of the
erroneous impressions under which the board has observed prac
titioners to be laboring. Bearing in mind what I said a while ago
as to the necessity for the presentation of facts, let me give a
fairly typical though composite illustration of what I mean:
An appeal was filed in which the taxpayer alleged two points of
error in the commissioner’s determination. The first was the
disallowance of the amount of depreciation claimed by taxpayer;
the second was the disallowance of an alleged bad debt for which
the taxpayer claimed a deduction. At the hearing of the appeal
the taxpayer did not appear, nor did any witnesses appear. The
representative of the taxpayer was present and offered nothing
but the following:
(1) A ruling of the bureau relative to certain rates of depre
ciation in the case under consideration by the bureau.
(2) A copy of the regulations of the bureau of internal revenue
relating to bad debts.
(3) A brief and an argument with citations of rulings and
authorities.
At the close of the case this was all the board’s record contained.
There was no evidence of the cost or the value of the property
sought to be depreciated; no evidence of the life of the property
or the use to which it was put; no evidence as to how the amount
claimed by taxpayer was determined.
On the second point there was no evidence as to the method of
accounting employed by the taxpayer—whether cash receipts or
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accrual basis; no evidence that a debt existed or that it had been
ascertained to be worthless and charged off; no facts of any kind
were presented.
The case was dismissed for lack of proof of any fact upon which
findings of fact could be made or a decision predicated. The
taxpayer’s representative called to see me and felt deeply ag
grieved. He said he had fully prepared his case and had set up
all the facts in his petition and in his brief. He felt that his case
had been completely and fully proved. As a matter of fact ab
solutely nothing had been proved. The record was completely
bare of facts. This representative of the taxpayer stated that in
his practice before the bureau he had usually presented his case
in just this manner and that a record so made was acceptable to
the bureau. He stated that he felt the rules of the board were
entirely too technical and that a certified public accountant would
be entirely unable to practise under such a system.
I give this illustration to impress upon you the difference be
tween the procedure in the bureau and before the board. It is
perhaps not necessary to point out to you that a petition is not
evidence of what it contains. It is merely a statement of what the
taxpayer intends to prove. In the illustration just given, if the
facts alleged in the petition were available for recitation in the
petition they were available for proof. As it was, nothing was
proved.
If, on preparing an appeal for presentation to the board, you
will analyze the situation you will soon find that the elements of
every appeal divide themselves naturally into two classes:
first, facts, i. e., things which actually exist, or did exist, or actions
taken or things done, said or written; second, conclusions, deduc
tions, opinions and argument deducible from those facts.
The first duty of the advocate is carefully to segregate these
elements. Having done so his next step is to establish the first by
evidence of their existence. This constitutes proof. His next step
is to prepare and present the conclusions to be properly drawn
from such facts by the application to them of law and logic.
In the logical presentation of an appeal at a hearing before the
board, there are three stages: first, the opening statement;
second, the proof, i. e., the establishment of the facts relied upon
in support of the appeal; and, third, the argument.
I desire to lay stress on the importance of the opening state
ment. It is here that the taxpayer’s advocate makes his first
6
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impression on his hearers on the board. A clear cut statement of
the issues involved followed by a concise narrative of the facts
intended to be proved and relied upon as the basis of the appeal,
followed by a brief statement of the principles of law involved—
these constitute a proper opening statement. On hearing such
a statement the board is immediately put upon notice of the
issues and contentions involved and the nature of the facts
supporting them. The board can then follow the development
of the appeal intelligently and with an understanding of the
relevancy and materiality of all that is said. A good, clear
and concise opening statement goes a long way toward helping
the side making it to win its case. This is because it is natural
for the human mind to appreciate and “ follow through ” logically
that which it understands. It is equally natural for the human
mind to reject and throw out of the equation that which is
not understood or is comprehended only in a foggy or nebulous
manner.
Here again, I would speak frankly and call attention to the
failure of some advocates, in this particular. It is not uncommon
for the taxpayer’s advocate in his opening statement largely to
confine his remarks to tracing the history of his case from the
first examination of the revenue agent down through its ramifi
cations and vicissitudes in the bureau. Much emphasis is laid on
what this conferee said or that reviewing unit did. The sum
total is a conglomeration of history, contentions, arguments and
recitals of mistakes made at various stages of the progress of the
appeal in the bureau. At the end the board is left with little or
no idea of whether the appeal involves bad debts, depreciation,
affiliation, special assessment or the application of section 331
with respect to invested capital. If your statement is clear and
the issues and contentions lucidly set forth, the board can watch
with interest the development of your proof in support of your
appeal. If there appears to be a gap, it is likely your attention
will be called to it and you will have the advantage of being able
to supply the omission before it is too late. If the board is
groping its way along attempting to deduce from your proof what
your issues are and your contentions relative thereto, it is hardly
probable it will note the hiatus in your proof and argument until
the appeal with the record comes up for study later. It is then
too late to rectify omissions which might have been apparent in
a more lucid presentation.
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The second stage in the presentation of the appeal at the hear
ing is the establishment of your facts. I have already dwelt at
length on this point and will not pursue it further here,
except to say that proof may be introduced either by the testi
mony of witnesses present at the hearing or by deposition (either
oral or by written interrogatories) taken elsewhere. The rules
seem to be sufficiently clear as to the manner of taking deposi
tions. I would call your attention, however, to the occasional
failure of the party taking the deposition to comply with rule 41
(d) of the board’s rules of practice, in that the two copies of the
depositions are not forwarded with the original to the board. It
is necessary for these copies to be received for purpose of service
on the parties. Parties have at times been embarrassed by their
failure in this particular.
While on the subject of depositions, I would say a word as to the
filing of applications to take depositions on the eve of the day set
for hearing of the appeal. The right of taking depositions is
granted by the board for the convenience of the parties and is not
intended as a means for securing continuances. I recognize that
exigencies do arise which make it necessary to file such an applica
tion at the last moment. Such cases will be considered on the
merits of the situation. As a usual thing, however, the party de
siring the deposition knows or has reason to know far enough in
advance that deposition will be necessary. It is his duty in such
case to move promptly. If he does so he will experience no diffi
culty. On the other hand, we have instances in which one
party allows his adversary to bring witnesses to Washington, or
have them on the way, and then files application to take deposition
and for a continuance. In such cases the application is denied.
In addition to the testimony of witnesses at the hearing and
documents made competent by them and to depositions taken
under the rules of the board, there is yet another form of proof
permitted by the board. I refer to the introduction of documen
tary evidence by stipulation or agreement between the parties.
While this relates to all documentary evidence your attention is
specifically called to rule 31 relating to ex parte affidavits.
The third stage of a hearing is the argument. I need not dwell
on this. Here, as in the case of the introduction of evidence, the
taxpayer has the right to open and conclude. That is, he is like
the housewife—he has both the first and the last say. If your
opening statement has been clear and your proof pertinent and
8
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material, the board can follow your argument with understanding
and appreciation. On the other hand, an argument can be of
little value or assistance to the board unless the issues and con
tentions are clear and unless the argument is supported by facts.
An argument properly supported by evidence is of great benefit to
the board and much attention is given to it. Without such evi
dence the argument is wasted. It is not necessary that argument
be made orally at the hearing. It may be confined to written
briefs. If a brief has been prepared beforehand it will be received
at the conclusion of the hearing. If either party desires to file a
brief thereafter, time is granted for that purpose.
At this point I would call attention to rule 18 of the board.
While I believe this rule is generally understood there are in
stances where it is apparent that it has not been understood or
perhaps not read. It is not the desire of the board to dismiss any
case under this rule, but it has been necessary in many instances
to do so. I hardly know how to express the rule more clearly
than it is stated. I will say, however, that in all cases where issue
is joined on a question of fact, the facts must be established to
prevent a dismissal of the appeal. This applies both to motions
and to hearings on the merits. By joinder of issue on the facts I
mean where there is a dispute as to what the facts are. If both
parties are agreed on the facts, of course there is no dispute about
them, and in such instance either or both parties may submit the
case on the agreed facts with or without argument. It is not
necessary that a party appear personally in such case. He may
advise the board that he submits his case without argument and
without appearance, or he may submit on the agreed facts and ask
for time to file brief. It sometimes happens that a taxpayer fails
to appear or writes that he will not appear. At the hearing it
appears the facts are in dispute; the commissioner moves to dis
miss; the motion is granted. Thereafter the taxpayer complains
that he submitted his case believing or thinking that the facts
were not in dispute. There is no way that I can think of to pre
vent this. Where the commissioner has answered the petition a
copy of such answer is forwarded to the taxpayer by registered
mail. A reading of the answer in connection with the petition
should advise the taxpayer whether the commissioner admits his
allegations of fact. If he does not, then the facts of the petition
must be proven. If the commissioner does admit the allegations
of fact contained in the petition, then there is no dispute as to the
9
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facts and consequently no proof is necessary, and the taxpayer and
the government may submit on the facts so admitted without
personal appearance and with or without briefs.
We have had considerable experience with motions to vacate
dismissal orders under rule 18, with request that the appeal be
restored to the calendar for trial or rehearing, or to permit the
taxpayer to come in and prove his case theretofore neglected in this
particular. It is not the policy of the board to do this in any but
exceptional cases. It is not deemed to be an exceptional case
where the party has not understood the rules or has failed to
realize when proof is necessary on the pleadings. The reason for
this is obvious. The board has before it an immense amount of
work. The appeals before it number thousands and are increas
ing at a tremendous rate. There are before us each day as many
appeals which are ready and awaiting hearing as we can hear.
Those who have prepared their appeals and have come to Wash
ington with their witnesses and representatives to try them are
entitled to be heard. As against such persons, the party who has
neglected or failed in the presentation of his appeal has no
equities. A legal axiom (centuries old) is that the law takes care
of the alert and waking man and not the neglectful and sleeping
one.
There is another provision in the statute which has been the
subject of some misunderstanding on the part of the board prac
titioners. I refer to section 900 (f)—the portion thereof com
monly referred to as the “30-day rule.” Congress has provided
that
“A division shall hear and determine appeals filed with the board and
assigned to such division by the chairman. Upon the expiration of thirty
days after a decision by a division, such decision, and the findings of fact
made in connection therewith, shall become the final decision and findings
of the board, unless within such period the chairman has directed that such
decision shall be reviewed by the board.”

From its organization the board has realized that uniformity of
opinions and rulings of the various divisions of the board is an
essential to its successful functioning. Accordingly, every safe
guard was provided to that end. From the very beginning of
the work of the board, the chairman has, within thirty days from
the date of a division decision, directed that such decision and
findings be reviewed by the board. This means that every
decision and finding which has been promulgated since the crea
tion of the board has been reviewed and discussed by the whole
10
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board. There have been some few instances in which the tax
payer after notification of an adverse decision by the board has
sought to have a review by the whole board—somewhat in the
nature of an appeal from the division to the board. If this were
the true construction of the statute it would mean that both tax
payer and the government could have two hearings by the board
of tax appeals in every case. It is not believed that such was the
intent of the statute. In no other place is there any indication
of such intent. The board has carefully considered the words of
the statute just quoted above and it is felt that congress was
making provision for uniformity of decision by permitting the
chairman to direct any or all opinions for the consideration of the
whole board. The statute does not anywhere indicate that the
review directed by the chairman should be a new hearing or a re
argument. If such is the case, and an appeal has had the review
contemplated by congress, then the decision announced as the
result of such review, is the opinion of the board and not merely
of the division which heard it. Since, as I have stated, all
decisions and findings have been reviewed by the board on the
direction of the chairman, the statute has been complied with and
there is no right of the taxpayer under the quoted section to
demand another or further review or hearing by the board.
Perhaps a word as to the practice of the board in this particular
would be of interest to you. When an appeal has been heard and
finally submitted—i. e., when all briefs or other data, time for
filing of which has been granted, have been received—the divi
sion hearing the appeal takes it under advisement. The record
is studied and briefs are read. The members of the division dis
cuss the appeal among themselves and on some appeals many
conferences are held among the division members before reaching
a conclusion and a decision therein. When a decision has been
reached the appeal is assigned to one of the members of that divi
sion for writing the findings, decision and opinion—if an opinion
is required or deemed necessary. If there is a division of opinion
among the members of that division another member is assigned
to write up the case in similar manner presenting the view or
views of the members in disagreement. When the decision of
the unanimous division or the decisions of the divided division
have been written and typed, it (or they) is (or are) distributed
among the members of the division for critical review. Further
conference or conferences are held and changes of form as well
II
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as substance are made. Then a vote is taken in the division on
the adoption of the decision in its then form, or on the adoption
of one proposed decision if two have been prepared. A majority
vote brings about the adoption of the decision as a “division
decision.” It is given a stamp date as of the day of its adoption
by the division. Immediately this decision is sent to the mime
ograph room of the board and there fifteen copies are made—
one for each member of the whole board. If a member or mem
bers of the division still dissent from the division decision as
adopted, a decision representing his, or their, view is likewise
mimeographed and circulated to all the members of the board.
The board meets in full conference on Friday and Saturday of
each week. The members who were not of the division hearing
the case have usually a week to ten days in which to study the
division decisions thus circulated, and each member is supposed
to, and does, read and prepare himself to vote on the division
decisions. At the board meeting the fullest possible discussion
of each case takes place. Many hours have been spent by the
board on a single case. When the discussion has been exhaustive
of the subject (and sometimes of the members as well) a motion
to adopt is proposed. It is not unusual for decisions to be sent
back more than once to be rewritten with a view to reaching the
proper result as the board sees it. I have gone into this matter
at some length to acquaint you with the fact that the decisions
of the board have the full consideration of all the board members,
and not only the members of the division which heard the appeal.
And now briefly about field hearings. As you of course know,
the board early in its existence sent to each taxpayer a mime
ograph letter advising him of his right to be heard by the board
in the field. When requests were made by taxpayers for such
hearings the appeals were placed on a suspense field calendar.
When a sufficient number of such appeals had been accumulated
to justify a division’s going into the field, a trip was accordingly
planned. It was decided to send the first field division to the
territory in the northwest and Pacific coast sections of the coun
try. Thereupon the field cases were called out and a field calen
dar carefully worked out as to time and place. The taxpayers
whose appeals were thus calendared were immediately notified
of a specific time and place to appear for hearings. The division
left Washington on May 2, 1925, and began holding hearings in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin. A week was spent there and the divi
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sion moved on to St. Paul, Minnesota, for ten days. Today
the division is en route from St. Paul to Seattle, Washington,
for a week. Portland, Oregon, follows with one week. The
division will then go to San Francisco and Los Angeles. It will
probably spend about six weeks in these two cities. It is ex
pected to return to Washington about July 20th.
It is our hope to send another division out in the fall of this
year to cover the central west (west of the Mississippi river) and
the southwest section. It may be possible for this division to
touch New Orleans and Atlanta on its trip.
To date there have been over 4,000 appeals filed with the board.
Of this number over 1,500 have been disposed of or taken under
submission. The appeals are coming in at the rate of between
one hundred and fifty and two hundred a week. The board has
so far been able to reach appeals for hearing within thirty days
of the filing of the commissioner’s answer. There are now about
5,000 enrolled practitioners on the rolls of the board.
As I said in the outset of these remarks, you and the board
of tax appeals have a common, a mutual, objective—that is the
search for the truth. Without it there can not be justice or or
derly government. With your help, we of the board hope to
find it. We may find it without your help but it will be infinitely
more difficult, and without your help we shall probably fail more
often. Since our interests are common it is your duty to render
this help. I can say to you as the representative of the board
that you can do this in no better and more effective way than
by bringing us the facts.
Again let me illustrate: Nebuchadnezzar had a dream and he
commanded to be called before him magicians, astrologers, and
the Chaldeans to show to him his dream and the king said unto
them: “I have dreamed a dream, and my spirit was troubled to
know the dream”. The Chaldeans answered the king; “Tell thy
servants the dream, and we will shew the interpretation”. The
king said to the Chaldeans; “The thing has gone from me: if ye
will not make known unto me the dream, with the interpretation
thereof, ye shall be cut in pieces, . . . but if ye shew the dream,
and the interpretation thereof, ye shall receive of me gifts and
rewards and great honor; therefore shew me the dream, and the
interpretation thereof.” They answered and said: “Let the king
tell his servants the dream, and we will shew the interpretation
of it.” And then the king sent for Daniel and Daniel told the
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king what his dream was and likewise explained to the king the
interpretation of the dream. Now, I daresay that when this was
told to the Chaldeans, the astrologers, and the magicians they
answered; “Of course Daniel could tell the king what his dream
was because Daniel is a prophet.”
Now we of the tax board are not prophets. In these tax
appeals we are in the position of the magicians and the Chaldeans
and the astrologers. Unless we know the dream we cannot
interpret it. Unless we know the facts in your case we cannot
interpret them and make a correct decision, because there are no
Daniels on the board.
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